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LIABILITY OF JOINT TORTFEASORS
IN COLORADO
GERALDINE KEYES and EDWARD L. TRUE*

Joint liability for injuries caused by tortious act is imposed
in several distinguishable situations which can be, for convenience,
divided into three basic categories. The first and most obvious is
the situation wherein two or more persons cooperate and act in
concert in the actaal doing of the tortious act. Here the liability
is joint because the act is joint. The second general category includes cases where two or more persons, acting independently,
commit separate tortious acts and an injury is inflicted upon a
third person as a result of the combined acts. Here joint liability
is imposed because each wrongdoer has contributed to the injury.
The fact that the actors were not equally culpable or that their
independent acts contributed in varying degree to the total injury
is not considered by the courts. They are each liable for the total
damage ensuing as each contributed to the injury, and as between
wrongdoer and injured party, the wrongdoer is at fault. The third
category, although not strictly involving joint tortfeasors, still
results in joint liability to the person injured. This is what is
commonly designated vicarious liability, or the liability of both
master and servant for the tortious act of the servant. In this
case the joint liability is imposed as a matter of justice to insure
compensation to the injured party. We mention this last category
only to point out a further method by which joint tort liability is
imposed. Rules as to contribution, indemnity, release, and satisfaction applicable to vicarious joint liability would not apply to
cases intended to be here covered. We therefore only mention this
form of joint tort liability in passing.
Colorado has recognized all three of these categories and has
imposed joint and several liability in each of them. In the case
of Reyher v. Mayne,1 the defendants trespassed upon land to hunt.
Coming upon the plaintiff's live decoys the defendants shot same,
and in the process, wounded the plaintiff. There, even though it
was contended by the one defendant that the shot injuring the
plaintiff was fired by the other defendant, the court said, "It is the
fact of participation, not the degree, or the extent, or the particulars, that makes every participant in such a tort liable. It is a
thing integral and indivisible. Each defendant here is properly
answerable for the sum of the damage inflicted by both wrongdoers." In Larimer and Weld Irrigation Company v. Walker, 2
two irrigation companies acting pursuant to an agreement for the
sharing of water, transferred, by the separate act of each, an ex* Students, College of Law, University of Denver.
190 Colo. 586, 10 P. 2d 1109 (1932).
-65 Colo. 320, 176 P. 282 (1918).
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cessive amount of water into a public stream which resulted in the
flooding of plaintiff's land. Even though the respective amounts
of water diverted by the two defendants were greatly unequal
the court held both defendants to be jointly liable for the full
amount of the damage on the grounds that each had violated a
duty owed to the plaintiff. The act of each, though done separately,
combined to become one act, the joint act of both.
In Alden v. Watson,3 the court held that the concurring negligence of two automobile drivers resulting in the injury of the
plaintiff, even though such acts were independent and the exact
proximate cause of the accident was not determined, made defendants jointly liable for the total harm caused thereby.
LIAILITY IS JOINT AND SEVERAL

Although there is not an abundance of Colorado cases involving joint tortfeasors, nor is there any statutory law regarding this
matter, it would seem from the limited cases that the Colorado
Supreme Court follows the common law rule that the liability of
joint tortfeasors, acting either in concert or independently, is
joint and several.
The early case of Carper v. Risdon 4 refused to repudiate
liability of tortfeasors even after dismissal as against some. This
was an action for an alleged conversion of mining machinery by
a former lessee against both the land owner and a subsequent
lessee. The court, in dismissing the action against the innocent
lessee, stated as follows:
The point is made that after the court had ordered
the dismissal as to Lindemann (lessee), it could not lawfully render judgment against Carper, because the complaint charged a joint conversion. For a joint trespass,
the liability is joint and several. This action might have
been brought in the first instance against Carper alone;
there might at any time before judgment, have been a
dismissal by the plaintiff as to Lindemann, leaving the
action to proceed against the other defendant; and, on
principle, we confess ourselves unable to see why the
court might not do what could have been done by the
plaintiff, or why it is not competent to either court or
jury, in an action for a trespass, to find one defendant
guilty and another not guilty.
Shortly after this decision, in
fendants for the loss of a trunk and
a verdict against one defendant and
held that a plaintiff is entitled to

an action against several deits contents, 5 the jury returned
acquitted two others, the court
a judgment against those de-

'106 Colo. 103, 102 P. 2d 479 (1940).
419 Colo. App. 530. 76 P. 744 (1904).
'Denver Omnibus and Cab Co -. Gast, 54 Colo. 17, 129 P. 233 (1912).
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fendants found guilty even though some of the defendants are
acquitted.
In an action in trespass for conversion of mining ore,6 where
the plaintiff chose to sue only one of the converters and not the
original trespasser, the court held that acts of conversion that are
ex delicto are joint and several and that the plaintiff was not required to join all tortfeasors in a single action. The court quoted
approvingly both Carper v. Risdon and Denver Omnibus and Cab
Company v. Gast, supra, as authority for this proposition. Still
further emphasis on this point was made in an action for malicious
prosecution, 7 where the court, in dismissing an action against one
defendant, said: "In an action for damages for malicious prosecution, the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several, and the
judgment may be against one, more, or all of them."
A partner's liability for the tortious acts of another partner,
even prior to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act by
Colorado in 1931, was joint and several. Even when partners are
sued jointly for the death of a mining employee, and one partner
dies before judgment, the action is not abated, and the case can
proceed to judgment against the surviving partner." In Bonfils v.
Hayes 9 the defendants contended they were operating as a corporation even though the charter had not been renewed. When this
contention was overruled, they maintained they were not a partnership and could not be held personally liable for the negligent
tort of the defendant's agent. The court in ignoring this defense, stated:
If they were actively co-operating in a business enterprise and, in connection therewith, committed the tort
in question, they are liable whatever the title of their
combination, partners, co-adventurers, joint tort-feasors
or what.
The Uniform Partnership Act 10 makes the partnership jointly
and severally liable:
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or with the authority of his co-partners,
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the
partner so acting or omitting to act.
The act further provides" that a partnership is bound to
make good any breach of trust:
OAmerican

Smelting and Refining Co. v. Hicks, 65 Colo. 146, 172 P. 1055

(1918).
'Bernstein

v. Simon, 77 Colt. 193, 235 P. 375 (1925).

'Rice v. Van Why, 49 Colo. 7, 111 P. 599 (1910).
70 Colo. 340, 201 P. 677 (1921).
"C. S. A., Ch. 123, Sec. 13 (1935).
C. S. A., Ch. 123, Sec. 14 (1935).
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(a) Where one partner acting within the scope of
his apparent authority receives money or property of a
third person and misapplies it; and (b) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or
property of a third person and the money or property so
received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership.
Liability of railroad companies using common tracks, for
injuries caused by reason of faulty maintenance of such tracks
was recognized early in Colorado history in the case of Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad Company v. Sullivan.1 2 Plaintiff was injured
as a result of a derailment of defendant lessee's car. In holding
both roads jointly and severally liable, the court made the following
statement:
Where one company owns a line of railroad and another company is permitted to use a part of the line, the
same duty devolves upon each to see that the road over
which it runs is safe and in good repair. Both companies
are liable for injury resulting from the negligent condition of the track. The liability is joint against both
companies, or single against either.
This rule of law has been followed whenever an analagous
situation has arisen. Where an explosion resulting in death occurred in a freight yard due to the negligence of the lessee of the
railroad tracks, both the owner of 13
the tracks and the lessee were
joined in one action and held liable.
Negligence ordinarily imposes joint liability where there is
a common neglect of a common duty owed either to individual
third persons or to the general public. The failure of both an adjoining lot owner and the city to cover a sidewalk excavation is an
obligation common to both and makes it possible for them to be
sued jointly or severally. 14 Employment of two physicians for
diagnosis and treatment which is performed negligently makes
them liable as joint tortfeasors. 15
At common law permissive joinder of defendants was limited
to cases of concerted action on the theory that the plaintiff had only
one cause of action and could recover only one judgment. Colorado
has consistently refused to follow this doctrine both before and
after the adoption of the liberal joinder provisions of the Colo-

21 Colo. 302, 41 P. 501 (1895).
"Willson v. Colorado & Southern Railway Co. et al., 57 Colo. 303, 142 P.
174 (1914).
1' Elliott et al. v. Field, 21 Colo. 378, 41 P. 504 (1895);
Goede v. City of
Colorado Springs et al. 200 F. 99 (1912); Belcaro Realty Investment Company
et al. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 87 P. (2d) 1114 (1939).
5 Bolles v. Kinton et al., 83 Colo. 147, 263 P. 26 (1928).
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rado Rules of Civil Procedure. This, of course, does not preclude
the plaintiff from suing joint tortfeasors severally.
RELEASE OF JOINT TORTFEASORS

A release is a surrender of a cause of action and does not
necessarily indicate that satisfaction of the claim through full
compensation for the injury has been received. Since at common
law releases were under seal, a release to one of two tortfeasors
that had acted in concert necessarily released the other, as there
was only one cause of action to be surrendered. American courts
have divided on this point. Colorado follows the common law rule
in holding that a release of a right of action against one tortfeasor releases the other. 16 This is true even though the release
itself indicated an intention not to release all of the joint tortfeasors.1 7 It would seem from the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court that joint tortfeasors are liable both jointly and
severally and a release of one is a release of all.
LIABILITY AS BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS

Historically contribution between joint tortfeasors has been
denied. Thus where a judgment has been recovered against two
wrongdoers jointly and only one actually satisfies the judgment,
he is left with no remedy against his fellow judgment debtor. That
one of two equally culpable parties should bear the entire loss
caused by the joint wrongful act while the other wrongdoer goes
free, so to speak, seems unjust and inequitable. The reason for the
rule seems to be that public policy will not allow the wrongdoer
who has responded in damages to ground an action upon his own
iniquity. In some jurisdictions there has been a distinction drawn
between the cases in which malice was involved and those involving only negligence, allowing contribution in the latter case but
denying it in the former. Several states have by statute allowed
recovery by one tortfeasor over against his fellow wrongdoer
in limited cases. Some seven states and Hawaii have adopted the
Uniform Contribution Among Tostfeasoss Act which completely
abrogates the common law rule denying contribution between joint
tortfeasors.
The authors were unable to find any case in Colorado directly
bearing upon the point of contribution between tortfeasors, nor
was any statutory enactment in Colorado found on the subject.
There is dictum in the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Maryland
Casualty Company 18 to the effect that where the joint tortfeasors
acted in concert contribution will be denied. As this is merely
dictum, and as no Colorado case has arisen where contribution
was actually denied, the question is to a great extent an open one
in this state. Just where the Colorado Supreme Court will draw
10Bowmanv. Davis, 13 Colo. 297, 22 P. 507 (1889); Denver & Rio Grande
R. Co. v. Sullivan, supra.
Ducey v. Patterson, 37 Colo. 216, 86 P. 109 (1906).
95 Colo. 99, 33 P. 2d 974 (1934).
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the line is only subject to conjecture. The rather liberal rule
adopted in the cases of indemnity of one tortfeasor by his fellow
wrongdoer, to be discussed later, may indicate that contribution
in Colorado might be allowed except in the cases of actual malice
or concerted action.
Indemnity of one joint tortfeasor from his joint wrongdoer
has been allowed in Colorado. In Colorado & Southern Railway
Company v. Western Light & Power Company,19 the court recognized the general rule that there can be no contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors but held that the case fell within
a well recognized exception to the rule where "the plaintiff's
negligence was antecedent, negative and passive, merely producing the occasion or condition, and did not contribute to the accident, and that the defendant's negligence, of a different character,
if not willful, was subsequent, active and positive, and the sole
cause of the collision." The wrongdoer whose negligence was the
actual cause of the injury, as between the two wrongdoers, is
primarily liable and must indemnify his fellow wrongdoer for
damages paid as a result of the injury done by such negligence.
In the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Maryland Casualty
Company,2' 0 where the elevator company's negligence consisted of
improper installation of the elevator cables and the Oil Exchange
Building Company's negligence consisted merely of failure to inspect such cables, indemnity was allowed not only to the extent
of monies paid in damages but also for expenses of defending
suits against injured third parties. The court said, "Oil Exchange
Building had the right to recover from Otis Company for its negligence as the primary cause of the accident." (Italics ours.)
In the case of Parrish v. De Remer,21 the Colorado Supreme
Court clearly stated a summarization of the above discussed two
cases. Speaking of the decision in Colorado & Southern Railway
Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, which was followed
by the Otis Elevator Company case, the court said:
In this decision the general principles announced
are: 1. That while there is a general rule which precludes
one wrongdoer from receiving indemnity from another
wrongdoer, there is an exception thereto which permits
a party who is in fault as to the person injured, but who
is without fault as to the party whose actual negligence
is the cause of the injury, to recover indemnity. 2. Where
an action is brought and both defendants are found
guilty, one who pays the judgment may have a cause
of action against the other for indemnity because the
question as to the negligence of which the defendant was
the primary, sole and proximate cause of the injury was
"73 Colo. 107, 214 P. 30 (1923).
2095 Colo. 99, 33 P. 2d 974 (1934).
'117 Colo. 256, 187 P. (2d) 597 (1947).
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not adjudicated and will not be deemed to have been adjudicated until it appears that such issue was actually
submitted and determined in said action for damages.
3. Even though one was guilty of some negligence resulting in damages to another, in an action for which, judgment was entered, this does not preclude, bar or estop the
judgment debtor from establishing that the negligence
of another was the sole, proximate and primary cause of
the injury, and if this fact is established by a preponderance of the evidence, the one paying the judgment is entitled to indemnification. 4. One who has been charged
with negligence as to another, and for which judgment
has been entered and paid, may maintain an action against
a joint tortfeasor for indemnification if he can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sole,
proximate and primary cause of the injury and resultant
judgment was the negligence of his joint tortfeasor. The
judgment against two joint tortfeasors is not evidence
in such an action, neither is it res judicata, a bar or
estoppel between these joint tortfeasors.
The law governing the liability of joint tortfeasors to one
another, rights of contribution or indemnity, is in a state of flux
and change in all jurisdictions. Colorado is no exception. The
total picture indicates a movement away from the common law
rule that contribution or indemnity will not be allowed between
joint tortfeasors. Some states have expressly abrogated this rule,
in part, by excepting certain situations by statute. Others have
accomplished the same result through judicial decision in recognizing exceptions to the general rule even though still espousing
that rule.
The law on these points is not clearly defined in Colorado.
The Supreme Court of this state has espoused the general rules.
They have said that contribution will be denied between joint
tortfeasors; they have said that indemnity of one joint tortfeasor
by his fellow wrongdoer will not be allowed. Yet they have not
denied contribution nor have they denied indemnity. In the case
of contribution, attorneys in the area have taken the court at their
word. The court said no contribution would be allowed, so no attorney has asked them to allow it. They said one of two joint
tortfeasors can not obtain indemnity from his fellow wrongdoer,
but when they were asked to allow such relief they found an exception to the general rule. Is it not possible, then, that when
presented with a proper case they may also find exceptions to the
general rule prohibiting contribution between joint tortfeasors?
Granting that as a matter of public policy one cannot ground his
claim on his own iniquity, could they not find that one may not
advance the culpability of another to shield his own wrongful act.
We do not know in what cases contribution will be allowed, or if
it will be allowed. We do not know when indemnity will not be
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allowed, but know only some cases in which it will be. We do not
know, therefore, we may still hope, that, unlike the common law
judges, our Supreme Court will approach the question with
an open mind oriented to the world in which we live. We
may hope that the absurd unfairness of shackling one of two
merely negligent wrongdoers with the entire financial burden of
damage caused thereby, simply because he is easier to collect
against, will not continue to exist in Colorado. We may still hope
that by approaching the problem with open eyes and minds our
Supreme Court will spare us the entanglement of one more statute.

WHEN THE SPOKEN WORD BECOMES A LIBEL
LESLIE KEHL and LORIN PARRAGUIRRE*

Due to the ease with which defamatory matter has been published since the advent of radio, television and other modern
media, the traditional distinction between libel and slander is without basis in reason and should be abolished. The existing distinction might well be compared to the living leaves on a tree whose
roots are dead. The foundation is gone, but the law founded upon
that foundation lives on. Ultimately, however, the law must perish
even as the leaves on the foundationless tree must fall.
Present day courts recognize the vanishing of the foundation,
but refuse to depart from the historical distinction between libel
and slander. The attitude of the courts is clearly expressed in a
recent federal case which stated, "The distinction between libel
and slander, although indefensible in principle, is too well recognized to be repudiated."'
To graphically show the results of the present law, consider
these practical examples. A letter containing defamatory matter
about X is sent to X but his secretary opens the letter and reads
the matter. Without proof of more X has an action against the
defamer. Suppose, however, the same matter had been published in an extemporanious television show. Then X would have
no action without proof of special damages or that the slander
was of the type actionable per se, since extemporaneous television
broadcasts were held to be slander in the only case dealing with
the point. 2 It is clear in which of the examples harm was most
likely to result, and yet it is equally clear that in many cases redress from the grievance could only be had in the less harmful case
of the letter read by a third person.
Take another example. X prepares a script in which the
Z hotel is referred to as a house of ill repute. X publishes the defamation by reading the script on a radio broadcast. Y states the
same defamation over the air but is not reading from a script at
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.
'Remington v. Bentley, 88 Fed. Sup. 166.
2 ibid.

